Sunday, July 31, 2011

Free Unlocker for Palm/HP Phones

A few weeks back, I ditched my iPhone for good and got my hands on a used Palm Pre. Unfortunately, it was net-locked by the provider. Fortunately, the modem is Qualcomm device and hence, all security features can be bypassed so easily that they appear meaningless in the first place. I've written unlocking scripts that work on every webOS phone, i.e. Palm Pre (Plus), Palm Pre2, Palm Pixi (Plus), HP Veer, or HP Pre3. You do not need a SIM card for obtaining the unlock code, and the unlock is perfectly safe, i.e. you can't brick your device. Here's a quick how-to:
  1. Install python 2.6.x (32 bit/x86 version): http://www.python.org/download/releases/2.6/. Python 3.x will not work.
  2. Windows: Install pywin32 for python 2.6: http://sourceforge.net/projects/pywin32/files/
  3. Install pyserial: http://sourceforge.net/projects/pyserial/files/
    Linux: Use your packet manager to install the required libraries, e.g. sudo apt-get install python-serial for Debian based distributions (Ubuntu, Mint, etc.) 
  4. Download the unlocker (Pre/Pre2/Pixi, or Pre3/Veer) and unpack it (e.g. into the directory C:\unlock)
  5. Calculate the USB passthrough key: go to device info, write down the "Serial Number", and use pre_keygen.py to generate the key from this number. The serial number is also printed on the back of your device and/or underneath the battery.
  6. Start the phone without a SIM card, then start the dialer. If the phone has not been activated before, you can either select "emergency call" with the icon from the notification area at the bottom (Pre, Pre2, Pixi) and delete the number (911, 112 etc.), or just type "BZ" (#*) blindly on the keyboard (Veer, Pre3). Enter "#*USBPASS# (#*8727277#) in the dialer application and press the dial icon.  A window will appear which asks you to enter the passthrough key. After you've done that, select "Diag" for the "USB PORT 1" (only for that port, the rest has to be set to "None").
    If you have trouble enabling the passthrough mode, bypass the activation, install Preware and install the "Enable USB Passthrough" application from Preware.
  7. Windows: Connect your phone to your machine and install these drivers for the serial diagnostics port (not the R-ACM or any other device). The first time you plug in the phone in diagnostics mode, Windows will ask you for drivers. You can also force the driver installation in the device manager by right-clicking the unknown serial port under "Other devices" and selecting "Update drivers". You might have to acknowledge a few warnings about broken driver signatures.
    Linux: Insert the module usbserial module with vendor and product parameters matching the vendor and product ID (lsusb), e.g. sudo modprobe usbserial vendor=0x0830 product=0x8043. You have to make the device file (usually /dev/ttyUSB0) accessible to regular users, or you have to run the unlock script with root privileges.
  8. Run pre_unlock.py / pre3_veer_unlock.py and write down your network unlock code.
    If the serial port is not found automatically or if the search is stuck, you can specify it as a command line parameter. Open up a command prompt, navigate to the directory (cd \unlock) and run the unlocker, e.g. pre_unlock.py --diagPort COM5
    If the firmware version has not been recognized, update your device to either the latest webOS 1.4.x or 2.x version. If you don't have a Palm account, you can obtain the updater here.
  9. Disable the passthrough mode: enter "#*USBPASS# (#*8727277#) and press the dial icon again. Set "None" for "USB PORT 1".
  10. Shutdown the phone. Put in a SIM card that is not accepted by the phone and boot it up again. You might have to bypass the activation mechanism.
  11. Carefully enter the network unlock code obtained in step 8. If it gets rejected, please contact me with the perso.txt file that has been saved to the directory of the script. Reboot and enjoy your unlocked phone.
    If and only if the unlock code does not work for you ("Enter Unblock Code"), try running the script with the parameter --writeBack from the command prompt, e.g. pre3_veer_unlock.py --writeBack. After it has completed successfully, reboot your phone and it should be unlocked.
    If you need to activate your phone, but your carrier does not support data services, you can try this.
The script should also work for Linux, MacOS, BSD and any other system which has drivers for the USB diagnostics mode and a python interpreter. I'd like to know whether this worked for you, so please leave a comment. Also, all sources of the unlocker have been released under the terms of the GPL. Feel free to hack away with them.

Tuesday, April 26, 2011

Shmuck of the Week: Alexis Toledo / novatec / biosremoval

Here's another guy selling passwords to people for ludicrous prices: $35 for 2 minutes of work - not bad. You'd think that he can afford a nice website by now, but it still looks like the final project of a community college web design class in the nineties:



Thankfully, his apparent lack of discernible technical knowledge made it very easy to find docs:
alexis toledo 
422 mystic ave
somerville, MA 02145
US
781-330-1378


Another address of someone who is involved with this is: 
Edisley Sousa
6xx American Legion Hwy
Rosindale, MA 02131 
US


There's a bunch of websites and accounts he operates under:
biosremoval.com
novatecdirect.com
revertendotecnologia.com.br
palmastec@gmail.com
hi5geeksolutions@gmail.com
biosremoval@gmail.com
youtube.com/user/alexisakaedisley

I've been collecting his stuff long ago, but never had the time to award him properly until he sent me this reminder:
Guess what...

If you ever have been foolish enough to send this guy money, please contact the paypal fraud department.

Update 1: I just love emails like that.



Update 2: Alexis resorts to empty threats in LARGE LETTERING. I won't be able to sleep tonight :(.


Update 3: Another victim has come forward...

Thursday, March 31, 2011

Roll Call - State of Electronics

The trailer of Karl von Moller's latest documentary gets my mouth watering:


Roll Call - State of Electronics from karl von moller on Vimeo.


Hopefully, it'll be out soon.

Sunday, March 6, 2011

Shmuck of the Month: Sony

Two types of companies exist: those which are growing and those which are dying. Sony clearly belongs to the latter for over a decade now. The high level of engineering that once made their products excel has been replaced by bland mediocrity and delusional control ideas that are manifested in recent Sony products such as Bluray, the PS3, etc. In their latest act of desperation, they are suing a couple of guys who have successfully hacked the PS3 to bring Linux back to the console after it has been illegally removed in a firmware update. The flaws they used to obtain access to the multi-millon dollar security system can almost solely be attributed to crass design blunders that would have been completely avoidable in the first place.

Sony has a line of laptops ("Vaio") which compete mainly in the high value market segments. They implemented a master password bypass which is rather sane in comparison to the rest of the bunch:
  • The randomly generated master password is only stored in RAM, e.g. it's lost after the next reboot ("one time password").
  • RSA is used for encrypting the password which is then converted to a human-readable form (4x4 characters/8 bytes/64 bits).
  • Their customer support apparently allows for one free password generation per device which is pretty decent by the industry standard.
However, they screwed up by choosing a key length that is just 64 bit and hence too small: an unoptimized python implementation of a general number sieve yields the factors of the key in less than a minute. With these, writing the generator script is an easy exercise:
python pwgen-sony.py
Master Password Generator for Sony laptops (16 characters otp)
Copyright (C) 2009-2010 dogbert

After entering the wrong password for the third time, you will receive a code from which the password can be calculated,
e.g. 73KR-3FP9-PVKH-K29R

Please enter the code:
D63K-XFVF-TK7H-RJKX
The password is: 43878945

 
I'm not the first one who discovered this: hpgl also reversed this scheme quite a while back. There are even some idiots on eBay who sell these master passwords. 

Update: released here

    Wednesday, February 9, 2011

    Shmuck of the Month: Conrado Davila / laptoprebirth.com

    Among the many contestants for this award, there are always some who stand out as exceptionally smug. Conrado has successfully gained access to this select class of people. This is an email from the first time he tried to contact me:
    By stating that he is "involved in the world of laptop hacking", he actually means that he defrauds people by selling them my stuff for only 40-50 $/password on his website:

    Among the clusterfuck of typographical mistakes and perspective errors in his graphics, he has thankfully put his full name and address in the whois record of the domain:
    laptoprebirth.com #17036
    conrado davila (conradodav@hotmail.com)
    eugenio sue 1279 colinas de san jeronimo
    Monterrey
    ,41600
    ES
    Tel. +34.955842323
    respectively
    NAME: Conrado Dávila de Gárate
    ADRESS: La Luisiana #3
    CITY: ARAHAL (SEVILLA)
    COUNTRY: SPAIN
    POSTAL CODE: 41600
    I'm sure that the local DA has an extensive record on him.

    The icing on the cake, however, is his sale of my GPL'd code to some gullible sucker for big bucks. That guy actually wanted to buy a generator for the Sony one-time-password stuff from him, so Conrado just modified my 5dec script to the effect that it seems to generate the password from the Sony one-time key. Suffice to say that it doesn't work at all since he has no technical expertise whatsoever. The other thing that he conveniently removed is my authorship of the script. Here's his delivery email:
    So this month, the prestigious "Shmuck" award goes to Spain. Congratulations - you earned it!

    Sunday, January 23, 2011

    Yet Another BIOS Broken by Design: InsydeH20



    Seriously, guys? The master password generator is linked in the other post...

    Wednesday, December 22, 2010

    Atmel SecureMemory Key Cracker

    A couple of years ago, Atmel started selling EEPROM chips dubbed as "SecureMemory" (AT88SC153, AT88SC1608). These chips are still in use today on many contact smartcards and other devices.
    Data sectors on that device can be read-/write-protected by requiring a proprietary challenge-response authentication. In addition, these devices also feature a basic password protection which is reasonably easy to circumvent as flylogic has demonstrated. The challenge-response authentication algorithm is vulnerable to a unroll/meet-in-the-middle attack to the effect that the secret key can be guessed from only a few eavesdropped authentication sessions - researchers from the Radboug University Nijmwegen have published a paper on this a couple of months ago.
    I've implemented their attack and recovered keys of several such devices successfully. However, an even more primitive, yet effective vulnerability is a man-in-the-middle attack: an attacker can easily take control of the bus after the authentication / password verification has taken place and inject data at his will. It's not hard to come up with some piece of hardware that does just that.  This is also a successful attack against the successor family, the AT88SC...C devices, which implements a slightly better authentication scheme.

    Tuesday, December 21, 2010

    Facepalm.jpg

    I've been poking around in the BIOS of a Fujitsu Lifebook A530 (source).
    What is wrong with this function:

    Wednesday, October 20, 2010

    Shmuck of the Week: 3_2_1_4you / bluechip82

    Here's another gem from eBay that a reader has sent me:


    3_2_1_4you's apparent lack of technological knowledge ("dos box tools" etc.) is just the icing on the cake. The epitome of his chutzpah, however, is the price at which he's trying to sell my stuff: $85 - just wow. That easily earns him the glorious "Shmuck of the Week" award.

    Update: Apparently, he's now going with the username "bluechip82".

    Saturday, September 11, 2010

    Another One Bites the Dust: HP/Compaq Mini Netbooks

    That was suprisingly easy:


    As always, the script (Windows binary) is released under the binding terms of the GPL - let's sit back and watch the decline of eBay prices and the sudden appearance of my code in the tools of the GSM idiots.

    Update: I got a couple of emails from folks for which the generated passwords didn't seem to work. It turned out that they confused the number "l" for the letter "1" and vice versa. If you find that it doesn't work for you, copy and paste the generated password from the script into an editor which has a legible typeface.

    Wednesday, September 8, 2010

    Shmuck of the Week: Jason Smith / mastermindit.biz

    Here's a screenshot of Jason's awful site:
    Designed like it's hosted on Geocities in 1995 - check. Shitty ads - check. Asking for donations without mentioning my site for the extremely hard task of running my stuff - check. So the Shmuck award goes to you, Jason - congratulations, you earned it!

    Saturday, July 10, 2010

    Shmuck of the Week: jebishere

    Among the many, many, many douchebags who just want to make a quick buck from the work of others, a reader of my blog found this gem on eBay:
    This is outstandingly presumptuous, and so the 'Shmuck' award goes to jebishere - congratulations!

    Sunday, July 4, 2010

    How to protect better: Secure BIOS Passwords for Laptops

    Since I get a lot of visitors from within the networks of computer vendors (hi guys!), I might as well just give you some hints on how to implement a laptop password in a more secure way. I understand that a lot of your customers forget their passwords and that it's just too expensive for you and your customers to swap the mainboards each time this happens. Also, you are prone to use the lame password implementations of the BIOS vendors. Don't - do your own stuff. Here are a few advices free of charge on how to do better:
    • Use better hashing functions for the passwords. CRC16, CRC32, etc. are a bad choice - they are invertible, and even if they weren't, a modern machine can find a hash collision within seconds because the keyspace is only 2^32 in size. Various implementations of better algorithms such as MD6 and SHA2 are readily available.
    • Use the machine's serial number in conjunction with the MAC address of the network card to salt the password before hashing it. If the password isn't set, just use both of these to check a hash stored in your 'NVRAM' anyway. This makes it a bit harder to just clone an EEPROM, FlashROM, or any other chip.
    • Try to calculate some portions of the algorithm not on the main CPU, but on the keyboard controller - this puts a physical obstacle on reversing the code. Also, provide a secure path for updating the code if the need arises - you don't want to have unencrypted code in your update binaries that can be easily disassembled and reverse-engineered.
    • If the password can't be verified, generate a random number from the RTC the third time an invalid password has been entered. Salt it heavily with serial numbers (laptop, MAC, CPU, etc.). Then hash it to generate a one-time password (OTP). Use public-key cryptography on the OTP, e.g. elliptic curves. DO NOT STORE THE PRIVATE KEY IN THE BIOS. Output the result to the screen, making sure that it is properly encoded ('O' vs '0', checksums). Do not save the one-time password anywhere. In fact, wipe it from the memory just after it has been encrypted. Make sure that it's really zero'd out everywhere (CPU cache).
    • When a customer calls the support and asks for a password reset, verify that he is indeed the owner of the laptop. Let him read the encrypted and encoded OTP to you, then calculate the OTP by decoding and decrypting it using your private key.
    • Do not hand out service tools to your service team which contain the private key. Instead, run a central password service on a server which is secured and can only be accessed with proper authentication. Actively monitor each and every access.
    • Do not charge customers for resetting a password. That's just lame.
    So.. I'm eager to see something more advanced than your current lame attempts at password protection.

    Saturday, June 26, 2010

    How to protect better: The Apple iPhone

    Apple's iPhone is a prime example for a well-engineered netlock protection. To this day, it has remained uncracked in principle: all current and past unlock solutions just patch the firmware running on the baseband modem to the effect that the netlock checks are overriden. These solutions basically inject code into the firmware 'on the fly' by exploiting buffer/heap overflows. A small piece of homebrew code runs on the application processor for just doing that - a jailbreak is therefore a prerequisite for an unlock. These firmware patches can't be permanently applied to the firmware of 3G and later devices because it is signature-checked by the baseband bootloader before it is executed. Whenever Apple decides to update the baseband firmware, they fix the injection holes. Firmware downgrades are blocked, so a way to permanently unlock the baseband has yet to be found for models other than the first iPhone 2G. In a nutshell, the protection works like this:
    • Two identification numbers unique to each device are generated from the NOR flash and baseband CPU serials: the norID and the chipID, 8 respectively 12 bytes in size.
    • The device-specific deviceKey is generated from truncating a SHA1 hash of the concatenated and padded norID and chipID. 
    • A supposedly random NCK ('network control key') is SHA1-hashed. With the hashed NCK and the norID and chipID, the second key nckKey is generated. The hashing algorithm uses Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA). The nckKey is also device-specific since both the norID and chipID are used.
    • A device-specific RSA signature is generated: two SHA1 hashes are generated from the norID and chipID. The status that the lock has after the correct NCK has been entered is also embedded into this message. The PCKS 1.5 format is used to pad the hashes and the status from (2*160+32) bit to 2048 bit (256 byte).
    • The asymmetric RSA algorithm is used for the encryption of the unlock signature. Keep in mind that the algorithm uses two different keys: a private key for encryption and a public key for decryption. With the private RSA key, the signature is encrypted and stored in protected memory.
    • This signature is encrypted with TEA once again using the device-specific deviceKey in CBC mode.
    In pseudo code, it looks like this:
    deviceKey = SHA1_hash(norID+chipID)
    nckKey = custom_hash(norID, chipID, SHA1_hash(NCK), deviceKey)
    rawSignature = generateSignature(SHA1_hash(norID+chipID), SHA1_hash(chipID))
    Signature = RSA_encrypt(rawSignature, privateRSAkey)
    encryptedSignature = TEA_encrypt_cbc(Signature, nckKey)
    The encryptedSignature is then saved to a protected memory area - the device has been locked. This happens when Apple issues the AT+CLCK="PN",1,"NCK" command presumably directly after manufacturing the phone.

    When testing a network code key, the baseband firmware reads the encryptedSignature, calculates the deviceKey and the nckKey from the entered NCK, decrypts the encryptedSignature with the nckKey using TEA, decrypts it once more with the public RSA key and verifies the signature with the SHA1 hashes of the chipID / norID. Here's the pseudo code:
    deviceKey = SHA1_hash(norID+chipID)
    nckKey = custom_hash(norID, chipID, SHA1_hash(NCK), deviceKey)
    encryptedSignature = readEncryptedSignature()
    Signature = TEA_decrypt_cbc(encryptedSignature, nckKey)
    rawSignature = RSA_decrypt(Signature, publicRSAKey)
    if ( (rawSignature has correct format) and (rawSignature contains both SHA1_hash(norID+chipID), SHA1_hash(chipID)) and (Lock status byte in rawSignature is OK) )
    .. accept every SIM card
    else
    .. block non-authorized SIMs

    A correct NCK key can be stored the application processor part of device. When a certain flag is set, the application firmware (iOS) feeds the NCK into the baseband modem during the boot-up. If the decrypted rawSignature passes the check, the baseband unlocks. This is what happens in factory-unlocked devices and iPhones which have been officially unlocked. It remains unknown whether some iPhones can never be unlocked by design even with the knowledge of the correct NCK: in the US, AT&T does not give out NCKs for any iPhone, even for those devices on which the contract has run out. This practice suggests that AT&T iPhones have a permanent barrier.

    On top of this, a WildcardTicket mechanism has been implemented on 3G and later devices. However, it is quite noteworthy that the WildcardTicket mechanism is overriden if the NCK can be verified (3G/3GS).

    Various lessons can be learned from this:
    1. The NCK is only stored indirectly on the device in a protected area.
    2. The signature which contains the information about the NCK is directly linked to the device. Hence, replicating a signature from another device will not work.
    3. The NCK is a 15 digit number which is presumably not dependent on the IMEI or any other serial number, but completely random. 
    4. Brute force attacks are foiled because a few expensive operations are necessary just to verify the code and the key space is large, e.g. the number of possible key combinations is big.
    5. A valid signature is implicitly required for an unlocked device. Factory-unlocked devices are shipped with such a signature, and during the official unlock process, this signature is generated.
    6. A fake signature for a device with known norID, chipID and NCK can not be generated because the private RSA key is unknown. 
    7. Consequent code signing makes permanent firmware patches impossible.
    8. Interestingly, the signature check itself is executed in the bootloader which isn't touched during a firmware upgrade.
    As a result, the protection withstands most attacks commonly used for unlocking.


    EDIT: Here is the re-implementation in python.